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Cyber-physical security is a significant concern for critical infrastructures. The 
exponential growth of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and the strong inter-dependency be­
tween the cyber and physical components introduces integrity issues such as vulnerability 
to injecting malicious data and projecting fake sensor measurements. Traditional security 
models partition the CPS from a security perspective into just two domains: high and low. 
However, this absolute partition is not adequate to address the challenges in the current CPSs 
as they are composed of multiple overlapping partitions. Information flow properties are 
one of the significant classes of cyber-physical security methods that model how inputs of a 
system affect its outputs across the security partition. Information flow supports traceability 
that helps in detecting vulnerabilities and anomalous sources, as well as helps in rendering 
mitigation measures.
To address the challenges associated with securing CPSs, two novel approaches 
are introduced by representing a CPS in terms of a graph structure. The first approach is 
an automated graph-based information flow model introduced to identify information flow 
paths in the avionics system and partition them into security domains. This approach is 
applied to selected aspects of the avionic systems to identify the vulnerabilities in case of a 
system failure or an attack and provide possible mitigation measures. The second approach 
is based on graph neural networks (GNN) to classify the graphs into different security 
domains.
Using these two approaches, successful partitioning of the CPS into different security 
domains is possible in addition to identifying their optimal coverage. These approaches 
enable designers and engineers to ensure the integrity of the CPS. The engineers and 
operators can use this process during design-time and in real-time to identify failures or 
attacks on the system.
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1. INTRODUCTION
CPSs are a combination of interacting computing, physical, and human operators 
controlled and monitored by logic and integrated physics (Pasqualetti etal., 2012). In recent 
years, there has been a significant increase in the development and deployment of smart 
and mission-critical computing systems that are characterized by tightly coupled embedded 
software devices and the physical environment (Humayed et al.. 2017). These systems are 
referred to as critical infrastructures and are ubiquitous in unmanned aerial vehicles, au­
tonomous cars, smart grids, emergency services, oil and gas distribution networks, chemical 
plants, manufacturing, communications, health care, and data centers. The security and 
availability of the critical infrastructures are of utmost importance, and failure in ensuring 
security and availability could have a catastrophic impact on economic growth and public 
safety.
Figure 1.1. CPS Architecture
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One of the key features of the CPS is the strong integration of cyber and physical 
processes. The physical environment plays a crucial role in these systems by providing 
necessary information to achieve significant functionalities. The integration of the physical 
and cyber worlds is achieved through sensors that constitute the physical world; controllers 
that render sensory inputs for cyber and physical elements, and actuators that drive the 
physical world via controller inputs in the physical world (see Figure 1.1) (Sampigethaya and 
Poovendran, 2013). Due to tight coupling between the cyber and the physical components, 
new forms of risk have been introduced in the CPS. These risks have not been considered 
adequately in the existing computing domain due to the lack of availability of tools to 
identify vulnerabilities that arise due to the complex interactions between the cyber and 
physical worlds. These risks can be classified as (1) cyber elements affecting the physical 
environment and (2) physical elements affecting the cyber components. These interactions 
lead to new security issues as assessing vulnerabilities and threats becomes challenging. 
In addition to these complex interactions, the complexity of the CPS itself presents more 
challenges in devising security mechanisms. Therefore, a concrete understanding of cyber­
physical interactions, threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks is essential to the development 
of efficient security mechanisms. Hence, assuring the confidentiality and integrity of 
information in a cyber-physical system is of prime importance.
Various security mechanisms have been deployed in the industry to identify vulner­
abilities and threats in CPSs. As each CPS infrastructure is different from others, different 
security models are designed to provide suitable solutions. One of the widely used methods 
to address the security vulnerabilities and threats are formal methods. Formal methods 
serve as a framework for the specification, design, and verification of software-intensive 
embedded systems, with a focus around provable functional safety and security targeted at 
CPS (Clarke and Wing, 1996). They are a widely used means to provide the capability 
to specify, model, verify, and integrate modern CPSs, and to design flows for enhancing 
functional safety and security. Formal methods are considered to be one of the most re­
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liable mechanisms to help achieve security and privacy in CPSs. They model embedded 
systems and adversaries in order to prove that a system under consideration is immune to 
various classes of attacks. They provide well-established scientific foundations in the form 
of precise adversary and system models and derive sound conclusions about the possible 
behaviors of the system as the adversary interacts with it. Formal methods work well when 
an adversary's behavior and the implications of an attack are well known.
Another popular security model to address vulnerabilities and threats in a CPS is the 
Byzantine model. This model considers a set of connected abstract machines as a graph in 
which few nodes may be faulty, and the communication link between these nodes to transfer 
messages are represented by formal expressions. Recently, there have been substantial 
progressions in automated and semi-automated formally verified analysis methods, such as 
the seL4 microkernel (Elkaduwe et al., 2008), the CompCert optimizing C compiler (Leroy 
et al., 2012), and secure vehicles and drones emerging from DARPA’s High-Assurance 
Cyber Military Systems (HACMS) program (Fisher, 2014).
With the growth in CPSs, the above mentioned approaches will not be feasible 
enough for two reasons:
• Any change or a new addition to the CPS will result in updating the security policy, 
and this could become tedious over time.
• As each CPS is attributed with different characteristics, providing a universal and 
scalable solution that can be applied to any CPS is difficult.
In this dissertation, two novel approaches have been introduced: (i) graph-based 
information flow analysis model and (ii) a graph neural network model.
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1.1. GRAPH-BASED INFORM ATION FLOW  MODEL - AVIONIC SYSTEMS
The graph-based information flow model is aimed at identifying the vulnerabilities 
in a CPS and providing mitigation measures. A study has been performed on one important 
CPS application of avionic systems to ensure the safety of the onboard cyber and physical 
flight systems as well as ground communication.
Aviation systems are a combination of many physical world components, such as 
electronics, hardware, infrastructure, and humans, which are heavily reliant on digital 
computing, storage, software, or data networking to function efficiently. Such components 
are becoming the heart of modern aviation infrastructure and are consuming and sourcing 
information at all times. Modern aircraft are advancing by incorporating the "cyber" 
layer in physical components, infrastructures, and humans for improving onboard system 
performance and services. The cyber layer must not only enhance performance but also 
enable it. An in-depth analysis of all cyber-physical properties, integrations, and risks is 
essential to ensure the security of the CPSs.
Advancements in technology bring new challenges for those involved with the 
process and maintenance of modern passenger aircraft. The consequences of software 
failure can range from insignificant (no effect on aircraft performance) to catastrophic (e.g., 
major avionic system failure and engine faults). With the advancements in communications 
and the quality of jet engines, there is an increased shift towards automation. However, 
automation creates additional problems such as pilots finding it increasingly difficult to 
cope with a lack of transparency of onboard systems which can lead to a loss of situational 
awareness and loss of control in flight (LOC-I). Loss of control has been the primary cause 
of accidents during the years 2010 and 2014 in which 43% of the 37 fatal accidents was due 
to pilot's lack of understanding of what was happening in the cockpit.
The limitations experienced by modern air transport system include loosely inte­
grated flight phases in time and space; voice communications between pilot and controller; 
predeparture operations based on manuals; and trajectories based on clearances not adapt­
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able to varying factors like failures, emergencies, congestion, and weather. These processes 
can be optimized by cyber-physical interactions using a range of solutions: trajectory-based 
flight operations, satellite-based navigation, communicating monitoring and position data, 
automated data links between pilot and controller, and a strongly connected information net­
work of real-time air traffic control and meteorological data (Sampigethaya and Poovendran, 
2013). The common impacts of cyber and physical interactions that affect performance must 
be balanced, as there are trade-offs to be measured. Additionaly, the Internet of Things 
(IoT) has introduced new challenges by making aircraft devices and sensors a standard rather 
than nice-to-have options. This makes the maintenance of secure data links an important 
factor for the pilots as well as the in-flight passengers. Aviation security has moved from 
the position of seldom-discussed to that of critical importance. With the evolving changes 
and the introduction of new systems, aviation security remains a critical area of research to 
improve security measures.
1.2. GRAPH NEURAL NETW ORK MODEL
A next-generation CPS requires the implementation of advanced deep learning al­
gorithms to incorporate intelligence into the physical processes to enable high-performance 
computing architectures to identify meaningful patterns. In this dissertation, a novel deep 
learning method has been introduced to classify the graphs of a CPS based on the attacks 
or failures in a CPS.
1.3. DISSERTATION STATEMENT
Information flow analysis supports the resilient design and active detection of anoma­
lies in CPSs. The complex nature of CPSs significantly increases the difficulty of determin­
ing information flow as well as mitigating the corresponding integrity problems. This work 
applies graph based analysis to CPSs to determine information flow and partition them into
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security domains based on the reliance of information flow paths. In this dissertation, two 
approaches have been proposed: (i) the first approach is based on graph-based analysis, and 
(ii) the second approach is based on graph neural networks.
The results show that the inter-dependency between the physical and cyber properties 
of a CPS can preserve and leak information. The key to formalize these approaches is to 
determine a consistent semantic representation of the cyber and physical elements, their 
interaction, and the physics of the system, and to devise a formal modeling technique for 
determining information flow. This dissertation presents a formal model for information 
flow analysis in a CPS and introduces an approach to perform the analysis, including 
both state-based analysis and automated analysis through graph networks. An avionics 
system, which is a critical infrastructure, is used to demonstrate the first approach, whereas 
various benchmark datasets from the chemical domain are used to demonstrate the second 
approach. The proposed approaches can analyze the information flows, verify whether 
the avionic system and the datasets used inherently preserve integrity, and categorize the 
security space into different security partitions based on the integrity level. The ultimate 
goal of these partitions is to identify the optimal number of security domains that illustrates 
the coverage of the security domains.
This dissertation attempts to represent the CPS as a graph-based network and find 
the optimal number of security partitions that define the trust level of the system. This is 
achieved by using two approaches:
• Graph-based analysis: This approach is used to identify the information flow paths 
and cluster them into security partitions.
• A neural network-based graph classification: This approach uses message passing 
neural network and edge convolutions to classify the graphs as either secure or non­
secure based on the edge and node attributes.
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1.4. DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
Section 2 describes the related work performed in the field of cyber-physical security, 
introducing the reader to the existing work done in this field and the associated shortcomings 
of implementing the existing methods. To illustrate the implementation of the automated 
analysis, Section 3 presents a brief overview of the avionic systems and information flow 
models. Section 4 presents the threat model used to identify attacks, vulnerabilities, threats, 
and countermeasures that impact the system. The graph-based information flow model is 
introduced in Section 5 and is applied to selected aspects of the avionic systems to identify 
the security vulnerabilities and propose mitigation techniques if applicable. Section 8 
presents the graph neural network model implementation and experimental results. Section 
9 discusses the summary of this work, limitations, and future work.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, a review of some of the previous work is introduced. This review 
helps in demonstrating the idea of information flow and also presents a few shortcomings 
that this work aims to avoid.
CPSs play an essential role in controlling and monitoring various control processes 
in critical infrastructure systems. Due to the complex nature of CPS interactions, there is a 
necessity to devise mechanisms to protect against attacks and failures. There is an increase 
in the analysis of vulnerabilities of CPS resulting from malicious, faulty components, and 
system failures. Various security methods have been proposed to address security issues 
such as the denial of service attacks (Amin et al., 2009), false data injection attacks (Liu 
et al., 2011), stealthy deception attacks (Teixeira et al., 2010), and replay attacks (Mo and 
Sinopoli, 2009) in critical infrastructures such as avionics, smart-grids, and autonomous 
vehicles.
2.1. CPS SECURITY
Research investigations have been carried out over the past decade that specify the 
importance of CPS security. Earlier works such as (Cardenas etal., 2011,2008a,b; Sandberg 
et al., 2010) reiterated the fact that the concept of cyber attacks is not only significant 
to the cybersecurity community but also to many other interest groups. Instead, these 
threats must be analyzed from an extensive system and infrastructure perspective, and that 
component-wise approaches may not be sufficient and need to be studied and analyzed from 
infrastructure-wide and system-wide perspectives (Dibaji et al., 2019). Deception attacks, 
disclosure attacks, and disruption attacks have been discussed at length in (Cardenas et al., 
2008b; Teixeira et al., 2015). CPS security issues arise in a wide-range of applications. 
On a regular basis, there are reports of cyber attacks in various sectors that include a
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cyber component. A large number of subsystems present in power systems indicates that 
the impact of cyber-physical attacks varies significantly depending on when and where 
they occur. In addition to these applications, CPS security was studied in (Cho and Woo, 
2017) to address the cyber attack in 2014 in nuclear power plants and analyzed various 
security methods to identify such attacks. In (Wang et al., 2016), a review on deception 
and disruption attacks in CPSs was performed. The importance of security in Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) was discussed in (Miller and Rowe, 2012) and in 
Modbus control systems in (Huitsing etal., 2008). A survey was carried out by (McLaughlin 
et al., 2016) on security aspects of information and communication channels of industrial 
control systems. The survey done by (Lamnabhi-Lagarrigue et al., 2017) on industrial 
control systems also signified the importance of security. Many researchers have used 
mathematical models that ed the physical systems and were composed of a set of relations 
between the system states and its control inputs. Control inputs are restricted by physical 
inputs to define a finite set of admissible inputs or controls. A deviation in these inputs 
results in inaccurate outputs, which in turn affects the system.
2.2. INFORM ATION FLOW  MODELS
Information flow security is yet another widely used approach to prevent secret data 
from leaking to malicious entities. Two primary variants of information flow security are 
either static or dynamic. The dynamic approach uses labels to describe the security level 
and propagates these labels to ensure the integrity of the data with respect to invariants or 
predefined policies, whereas the static approach executes information security policies. A 
vast majority of research in this field is focused on proving the non-interference property 
(describes the information flow restrictions) and using a combination of language features 
and system models to implement information flow security (Sabelfeld and Myers, 2003).
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In the literature, various information flow models based on process algebra have 
been introduced. In (Lowe, 2004) the author introduced a new definition of information 
flow based upon an operational model of communicating sequential processes (CSP), which 
analyzes how the behavior of one entity or agent can influence another entity’s or agent’s 
view of the system. There is an extensive amount of research done in the area of CPS 
security to address the security issues by using information flow paths. The real challenge 
for information flow security is applying the vast theory and language-based designs such 
as Jif (Myers et al., 2001) and FlowCaml (Pottier and Simonet, 2002; Simonet and Roc- 
quencourt, 2003) to real-world problems (Zdancewic, 2004). Widely known methods to 
perform security analysis are formal methods that consider the cyber-physical interactions 
to identify potential risks and challenges that arise due to the complex transformations in 
airplane systems.
2.3. CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY IN AVIONIC SYSTEMS
The research in ADS-B security either focuses on cyberattacks or physical com­
ponent failures, but not both. Significant research has been done in this field to analyze 
the security vulnerabilities, attacks, and system failures in avionic systems (Manesh and 
Kaabouch, 2017; McCallie et al., 2011; Strohmeier et al., 2014). A time-stamp based 
method based on signal propagation time to identify and reject spoofed ADS-B messages 
between senders and receivers was proposed by (Kim et al., 2017). A light weight security 
solution to guarantee the privacy and integrity of ADS-B messages by integrating crypto­
primitives such as FFX and TESLA was proposed by (Yang et al., 2017). Similar work 
was carried out in (Yang et al., 2018) for congested data links and resource-constrained 
avionics. In (Thudimilla and McMillin, 2017), ProVerif was used to identify the attacks in 
ADS-B and TCAS systems. The analysis was limited to proving observational equivalence 
(anonymity property) through the composition of processes, thus lacking computational
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capability. Several works have been done to analyze the security vulnerabilities, attacks, 
and system failures in ADS-B systems (Manesh and Kaabouch, 2017; McCallie etal., 2011; 
Strohmeier et al., 2014) that consider cyber attacks alone.
2.4. OTHER RELATED WORKS
Anomaly detection in CPSs has been extensively studied. Practical problems with 
this approach include the need for precise knowledge of the system’s design and configura­
tions as well as the need to accurately model the system’s complex physical behavior. The 
authors in (Mitchell and Chen, 2014), categorized anomaly detection methods as knowledge 
and behavior-based methods. Knowledge-based detection techniques examine well-known 
attack characteristics but require keeping a dictionary of attack signatures. Despite having 
low false positive rates, these methods are ineffective against zero-day attacks. In contrast, 
behavior-based techniques check for anomalies in runtime behavior. These techniques are 
pervasive in CPS anomaly detection, since CPSs are automated and present more unifor­
mity and predictability than conventional information technology (IT) systems (Kravchik 
and Shabtai, 2018).
There are multiple anomaly detection techniques such as statistical process control 
(SPC) (mur, 2016) that include shewhart charts, exponentially weighted moving average, 
and cumulative sum. These methods are inadequate to handle the complex nature of the 
CPS as CPS operates in an unpredictable environment. Consequently, this has resulted in an 
increased shift from the formal specification or signature-based techniques to the machine 
learning techniques to develop rational and adaptive approaches to identify anomalies in 
CPSs (Kravchik and Shabtai, 2018). Nevertheless, the implementation of machine learning 
techniques in detecting anomalies in data is considered a challenging task. This is mainly 
due to the dependency of these methods on enormous amounts of labeled data and the 
anomaly classes to learn from, in which inconsistencies are usually rare or neglected in
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the real environment. In addition, most of the existing unsupervised methods may not be 
effective to recognize anomalies due to the existence of temporal dependencies and noise 
in real-time applications.
Below are some of the tools used for CPS security in the literature.
• UPPAAL: UPPAAL is an integrated tool environment for modeling, validating, and 
verifying real-time systems modeled as networks of timed automata (Behrmann et al., 
2004). Few functionalities of the UPPAAL extension include visualization of the 
results in the form of probability distributions, time-bound based evaluation of the 
number of runs, and computation of expected values.
• Statistical Model Checking (SMC): SMC refers to a set of techniques that monitor 
several runs of a system concerning the specific property. SMC utilizes results 
from statistics to get an overall estimate of a design's correctness by approximating 
undecidable problems. This approach has been widely used in model checkers. 
Traditional SMC model checkers described in (Katoen et al., 2011; Sen et al., 2005; 
Younes, 2005) are inadequate to handle timed systems and are limited in either 
addressing the capability of computing an estimate of the probability or testing 
whether this probability is greater or equal to some threshold.
• Petri nets: Petri nets are a mathematical and graphical modeling tool that describes the 
structure and behavior of a system by modeling distributed causality and concurrency 
of a system (Peterson, 1977). Petri nets have been widely used in manufacturing 
systems, fault-tolerant systems, formal languages, and communication networks.
• MoDeST: Another framework that is used for model checking is the MoDeST toolset 
(Bohnenkamp etal., 2004) which handles the specification of stochastic timed systems 
but fails to yield full stochastic models in case of parallel composition.
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There is a necessity to address the security vulnerabilities that arise from the complex 
interactions between the cyber and physical components. This dissertation is aimed at 
addressing the above-specified issues by focusing on cyber and physically enabled attacks 




This section presents a brief overview of the various security models and avionic 
systems used in this dissertation.
3.1. SECURITY MODELS
Security models are used to determine the implementation of security, agents that 
can access the system, and the objects that they can access. To be precise, they are a way 
to validate security policies. In general, security models are implemented by enforcing 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability (also referred to as CIA triad).
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality is the term used to ensure privacy. Confidentiality 
plays a vital role in preventing sensitive information from being leaked to unauthorized 
personnel.
• Integrity: Integrity is one of the essential elements of security objectives. Integrity 
plays a vital role in security because it can verify the modification of data by unautho­
rized users, unauthorized changes made by authorized users, and ensures consistency 
of data internally as well as externally.
• Availability: The system’s availability to authorized users is vital for an information 
system to be useful. Availability ensures uninterrupted access to the system. Threats 
to availability include non-malicious threats such as system failures and malicious 
threats such as denying access to users.
3.1.1. State Machine Model. The state machine model is based on a finite state 
machine and is used to model complex systems (Conrad et al., 2012). They deal with 
different attributes, such as actions, transaction functions, and state variables. The state
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machine defines the behavior of a finite number of states, the transitions from one state to 
another state, and actions that result from the transitions. A state machine model prevents 
the system from entering into a vulnerable state by monitoring the system’s state. The state 
machine model is considered a foundation for many security models as it relays the state of 
the system at a given time.
3.1.2. Inform ation Flow Model. The information flow model is based on the state 
machine concept and serves as the basis for designing popular security models such as the 
Biba, Bell-LaPadula, non-interference, and non-deducibility models. The information flow 
model is composed of objects, state transitions, and states. The ultimate goal of this model 
is to prevent insecure information flow and unauthorized access.
3.1.3. Non-interference Model. The non-interference model defined in (Goguen 
and Meseguer, 1982) states that “objects and subjects of different levels do not interfere 
with the objects and subjects of other levels. The model uses inputs and outputs of either 
low or high sensitivity. Each data access attempt is independent of all others, and data 
cannot cross security boundaries.” In terms of CPS modeling, objects refer to subsystems, 
components, or documents, whereas subjects refer to operators, system users, networks, 
applications, or processes. In this model, a system’s sensitivity levels are categorized as 
low or high. Low sensitivity represents unclassified information, whereas high sensitivity 
represents classified information or resources that require specific clearance to access. It 
essentially states that users with low sensitivity cannot learn information about the user’s 
activities with high sensitivity.
With the non-interference model, a strict separation of various security levels can 
be achieved by hiding activities with high sensitivity irrespective of what lower-level users 
can see or access. This separation ensures minimizing leaks and breaches that might occur 
through secret channels. This model considers the impact of higher security level subjects’ 
activities on the system’s state, keeping lower security levels separate. Hence, creating 
covert channels through shared resources or inference attacks is not possible.
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3.1.4. Non-deducibility Model. In 1986, David Sutherland (Sutherland, 1986) 
introduced the information-theory based non-deducibility security model to quantify the 
information flow from one user to another. Sutherland’s definition states that "Given a set 
of possible worlds Q and two information functions f \  and f 2 with domain Q, we say that 
information flows from f \  to f 2 if and only if there exists some possible world m and some 
element z in the range of f 2 such that z is achieved by f 2 in some possible world, but in 
every possible world o>' such that f\(o>') = f\(m ), f 2(m') * z". Each discrete execution of 
the system can be considered an element of the set of possible worlds. Information about 
the system is represented by an information function whose domain is the set of possible 
worlds. This model is considered to be too restrictive and weak as the information can flow 
from high-level objects to low-level objects but the reverse is not possible.
3.2. AVIONIC SYSTEMS
MSDND is applied to selected aspects of the avionic systems to check for fail- 
ures/attacks and then partition them into different security domains based on the behavior 
they exhibit.
The aviation industry experienced exponential growth in computing capabilities 
and interaction complexity. Current practice addressing safety concerns include a build and 
test approach following industry-standard recommended practices such as SAE ARP 4761 
and 4754. The software development practices furnish limited attention to nonfunctional 
qualities such as timing, latency, performance, reliability, safety, or security. These concerns 
are usually addressed by modeling and analysis or simulation, which are captured by 
analytical models that quickly become outdated as the architecture and design emerge. This 
results in delayed discovery of system-level errors, with studies showing up to 80% leakage 
to this phase.
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Modern aircraft are heavily reliant on the extensive use of electronic instruments 
and displays. The significant advantage of using electronic devices is the ease of exchange 
of data between different devices. It serves as a basis for not relying on the flight manuals 
and provides improved automatic flight control.
Modern aircraft use increasingly sophisticated avionic systems that are composed 
of heterogeneous CPSs that assist in controlling and operating the plane by the crew. These 
systems use microprocessor-based computer systems and are composed of hardware and 
software components that are capable of processing large amounts of data in a short time. 
Avionic systems are deployed in a wide variety of applications, such as flight control 
and instrumentation systems, navigation, and communication systems. These systems 
function by receiving data from multiple sensors, including air temperature probes, fuel 
sensors, angle-of-attack probes, and pitot-static pressure systems. These computers process 
data from the sensors, apply various functions and forward information to the electronic 
displays. The pilots continuously monitor the status of the engine and environment from 
these displays. These systems collect information from many interacting components to 
ensure the proper functioning of the system.
Most integrated multi-sensor applications receive information from multiple sensors 
to provide redundancy management, improve performance, achieve graceful degradation 
when sensor failures occur, and increase robustness. Flight operations that provide guidance 
information to the pilot depend primarily upon precise and continuous awareness of flight 
position and attitude. Technical requirements for air navigation systems primarily include 
accuracy, physical attributes such as weight and volume, electrical power, and system 
integrity.
A detailed description of the various components used in scenarios described in 
Section 7 can be found in Administration (2016, 2017). Flight instruments enable an aircraft 
to be operated with maximum performance and enhanced safety, especially when flying 
long distances. Manufacturers provide the necessary flight instruments, but to use them
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effectively, pilots need to understand how they operate. Pilots need to be very familiar with 
the operational aspects of the pitot-static system and associated instruments, the vacuum 
system and associated instruments, the gyroscopic instruments, and the magnetic compass.
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4. THREAT MODEL
Before coming up with a security solution, having the knowledge of who/what we 
protect a CPS from is of great importance in addition to the knowledge of existing attack 
mechanisms, vulnerabilities, and failures. The potentiality aspect is critical in this context; 
potential threats that may not necessarily have occurred, but might. The loss might be 
in safety measures, confidentiality, integrity, safety, or availability of resources, whereas 
the harm implies harming people, the environment, or systems. As CPS applications are 
becoming more ubiquitous, people are becoming a critical asset to protect, in addition to 
the information and communication elements.
Building a good threat model is crucial to assess the security vulnerabilities in the 
system and coming up with efficient mitigation measures. To launch an attack an adversary 
must compromise one or more components in the system or introduce malicious components 
into the system. The threat model is composed of the following:
• Source: The source of a threat is the entity responsible for initiating a threat which 
includes system failure, adversarial attacks, and environmental factors.
-  Failures: This class of threats represents an observable error in the system that 
is caused accidentally or by malfunction of a legitimate CPS component.
-  Adversarial: This class of threats represents a malicious outside attacker or an 
insider with an intention to compromise the system. Few examples include 
terrorists, activists, and criminal groups trying to compromise the system by in­
jecting malicious data or tampering the existing data. Adversaries can be passive 
or active. Passive adversaries have limited capabilities such as eavesdropping on 
communication channels, whereas active adversaries have the ability to modify 
the contents of the communication channels and compromise the data.
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-  Environmental: This class of threats represents failures or malfunctions caused 
by natural disasters.
• Goal: The ultimate goal of the threat model is to capture the features of the system 
that may lead to system failure or identify the features that are modified as a result of 
an attack.
• Consequence: The attack or failure in a CPS results in compromising integrity, safety, 
and availability of the system. In this threat model, attacks and failures are considered 
to exhibit similar behavior (Stroud, 2003).
In case of an attack, the adversary is assumed to have full control of the faulty 
components: the adversary can eavesdrop, intercept, and modify any message with respect 
to the faulty component. In this section, failures and attacks are assumed to be arbitrary and 
unbounded. The threat model assumes that the adversary cannot exploit certain aspects of 
the systems such as:
• The adversary cannot corrupt or modify the proposed model.
• The adversary cannot modify more than half of the participating entities to perform 
specific operations.
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5. M ULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY
Traditional security models such as the Bell-LaPadula model, non-interference, and 
non-deducibility are better expressed in terms of Shannon-style information flow (McLean, 
1990). Extending this work, researchers have introduced flow-based security models by 
analyzing security-relevant causal factors. Models such as non-interference, Generalized 
non-interference, and extensions to non-interference designed to protect high-level output, 
are not flexible in considering causal factors as they require to consider programs as explicit 
input to systems. The Bell-LaPadula model that primarily addresses access control has few 
drawbacks such as the model addresses only confidentiality and does not address access 
control over covert channels (Gallagher, 1992).
Early research in security models focused on the nondisclosure of information. 
There has been a significant shift towards integrity models due to the importance of data in 
decision-making and actions (McCumber, 1991). A CPS’s safety can be compromised by 
a failure to understand requirements or defects in its implementation. In terms of security, 
defining what a system should do is comparatively a difficult task as a high degree of 
precision is required to prevent undesired outcomes or defects. To increase the model’s 
precision, researchers have used formal language or information-theoretic approaches to 
model CPSs.
This shift toward information-theoretic models of security introduces new oppor­
tunities to develop security models that have significant dependence on information flows. 
One primary class of security models that are proven to be the closest match to this approach 
is the non-deducibility property. This property is essentially based on a theory of informa­
tion sharing, which attempts to ensure security by partitioning the security space into just 
two partitions or domains: high and low. On the other hand, non-interference based models 
include information flows inherently, but there has been little work done in developing a
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method for evaluating such models. Will these absolute partitions guarantee to identify the 
inconsistencies in the system? Will these partitions help in identifying attacks in a complex 
CPS with more than two security partitions? To address these issues, this section presents 
an improved version of non-deducibility called Multiple Security Domain NonDeducibility 
(MSDND), which considers multiple partitions.
5.1. MODAL LOGIC
The applications of modal logic to mathematics and computer science have become 
increasingly essential (Goldblatt, 2006). Modal logic refers to the validation of an expression 
in the form of ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’. The term ‘modal logic’ is used more broadly 
in the security domain, which is a family of logics to characterize the difference between 
valid and invalid arguments. Creating a logic is a difficult task as it is dependent on a set 
of axioms and rules designed to prove the valid arguments statable in the language. The 
main challenge lies in achieving soundness and completeness by formulating every valid 
argument as proof in the system. Modal logic is an umbrella term for a variety of classes, 
such as provability logic and advanced modal logic.
Modal logic is primarily used as a tool for representing structures or models. Modal 
logic talks about algebraic semantics, topological semantics, and graphs. These are known 
as Kripke semantics for modal logic and is the best-known style of modal semantics. 
In the literature, modal logic has been used as a tool for reasoning about time, beliefs, 
computational systems, necessity, and possibility (Blackburn and Van Benthem, 2007). 
Although diverse, these applications have some critical things in common such as time- 
flow, relations between cognitive alternatives, computational state transitions, and networks 
of possible worlds. All these can be represented as simple graph-like structures, and modal 
logic is proved to be an appealing tool for handling such structures as they are rich in 
representing information.
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5.2. M ULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY (MSDND)
MSDND was introduced in (Howser and McMillin, 2013), which is based on modal 
logic (Blackburn etal., 2006; Goldblatt, 2006) to address the shortcomings of the traditional 
security models which work well only if the boundaries for the security domains are clearly 
defined. The MSDND model presented in (Howser and McMillin, 2013) can check for 
non-deducibility with respect to two states at any single point of time. Calculating the 
security domains for complex infrastructures are difficult. However, our work is aimed at 
handling this issue as well as automating the MSDND analysis for partitioning the security 
domains based on the information flow traversal.
In this dissertation, {V} is used to define a set of valuation functions, such that 
Vls (w) indicates the value of state variable Sx as seen by an entity i in world w. NOTE: 
If the state variable, say Sl has no valuation function, which returns the value of a state 
variable, then MSDND fails to determine the value of that state variable nor the value of 
any logical expression associated with the state variable (Howser and McMillin, 2013).
Note: State variables are represented by <̂0, <£i, ....^m or by a combination of state 
variables represented by Sx.
Sx = ^ 0  A ^ 1  A ^ 2  A ^3 A ....
In this paper, each state variable is associated with the component ID (See Figures 5.1 
and 5.2). For example, Satellite 1 is represented by <̂0, Barometric Altimeter by and 
control panel by <̂9.
5.3. M ULTIPLE SECURITY DOMAIN NONDEDUCIBILITY MODEL (MSDND)
This section discusses the MSDND model to check for non-deducibility with respect 
to multiple states and overlapping security domains. It also introduces various definitions 
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5.3.1. Definition: M ultiple Security Domain Exclusivity. There exists some 
world with multiple states in which, at any instance, the system can be in one true state, and 
the others are false.
(where one of Sa, Sb,Sc, ... is True (5.1)otherwise False
5.3.2. Definition: Event System. Event System (ES) is a composition of a different 
sets of objects and the events that are passed from one object to another based on the inputs. 
The shift of these objects and events triggers the transition of one state to another state.
5.3.3. Definition: Security Domain. A security domain is a logical partition of 
the ES based on different parameters depending on the context of entity i. Each security 
domain is composed of different states.
u UieISDi = (ES) (5.2)
5.3.4. Definition: M ultiple Security Domain NonDeducibility. In the MSDND 
model, an entity i is any part of the system capable of independent observation or action. 
The ES consists of multiple security domains, SDi, as viewed by each entity i in the model. 
These domains may, or may not, overlap depending on the complexity of the ES (Howser 
and McMillin, 2013). A system is MSDND if
MSDND (ES) = 3w e W: [w h □ f  (Sa,Sb,Sc,....)]
A [w N ($V)Sa A ^ S fc A ^ . . . ]
(5.3)
An MSDND proof creates a logical argument of conditions on the observable state 
of the system under consideration. These conditions are assessed for their valuation from 
the point of view of a particular security domain. The valuation function determines the 
validity of a particular state based on the validity of the preceding states. If no valuation
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function can be found, then the system is MSDND secure (which is a bad thing as it means 
an attacker can hide their actions from a particular security domain). Breaking MSDND is 
a good thing as it means the system can detect the attacker.
As mentioned earlier, we use a variant of MSDND modal (Howser and McMillin, 
2017) to model complex CPSs and analyze the security vulnerabilities. MSDND is used to 
model avionic systems to identify the vulnerabilities and propose mitigation techniques.
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6 . GRAPH BASED MSDND
The analysis used in this work considers an aircraft system as a graph network where 
each node represents a component in the system, and the edges represent the information 
flow between two nodes. Each edge consists of a set of labels, and each label has a value 
associated with it. This algorithm consists of five steps:
• Identify all the paths in the network using DFS with respect to a label, which indicates 
the information flow from one node to another and sorts the result set in descending 
order of subgraph size.
• Identify the subgraphs and eliminate them to get a reduced unique subgraph set.
• In the reduced set, traverse through each edge to check for discrepancies indicated 
by the inconsistent values associated with the edge labels during run-time and design 
time. The discrepancies in the data are caused by an attack or a failure in the system. 
These discrepancies can be identified by finding the in-degree for each node and check 
for the consistency of the values associated with labels.
• A node with in-degree > 3 will help break the NonDeducibility, as it contains more 
than two information flow paths, which helps identify the faulty component or the 
component under attack, which is responsible for sending incorrect data.
• Classify the information flow paths into Secure and Non-Secure domains based on 
the valuation function.
A graph G = (V, E, L) consists of a set of nodes V, a set of edges E, and a set of 
labels L associated with each edge. A graph S = (Vs, Es, Ls) is a subgraph of graph G = (V, 
E, L) iff V  c V, Es c E and Ls contains l where l is the label under consideration.
Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 represents various interacting components in an aircraft 
referred as nodes. Each edge has a set of labels and values associated with them, which 
represents the information flow.
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Algorithms 1 and 2 are used to find all the graphs associated with each label and 
eliminate the subpaths in order to obtain unique graphs for each label. Source code for these 
algorithms can be found here: https://github.com/anushaat/MSDND
6.1. FINDING INDEPENDENT PATHS
Algorithm 1 uses DFS to find all the paths with edges labeled with l. Theorem 6.1.1 
presents the logical arguments that are necessary to prove the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1: In DFS of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V, E, L), vertex s is a 
descendant of vertex d iff the search discovers d, that there is a path from s to d consisting 
entirely of edges with label l.
Proof: Suppose that DFS is run on a DAG G = (V, E,L) to determine the independent 
paths for each vertex vi e V. It suffices to show that for any pair of distinct vertices s, d e V, 
if G contains an edge from s to d . If s = d, then the path from s to d contains only s which 
indicates the source or initial node. If d is an immediate descendant of u, then the path from 
s to d contains label l. If d is any descendant of s, all edges on the simple path from s to d 
contains label l.
With a runtime complexity of O(V + E ), where V represents the number of nodes 
and E  represents the number of edges, this algorithm will result in all the subpaths associated 
with the specified label.
6.2. ELIM INATE SUBPATHS
This algorithm is aimed at eliminating the frequent subpaths which occur more 
than once. This helps in achieving non-redundant subpaths, which helps in identifying the 
faulty component or the component under attack. Theorem 6.2.1 provides necessary logical 
arguments to prove the correctness of Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to find independent paths
Input: Graph dataset G, find all the paths with respect to label l 
Output: Result set R which includes all paths associated with each label l 
1 : function DFS(G,u)
2 : visited.add(u)
3: if onPath.contains(u) then
4: result.add(Path)
5: else
6 : for all v e adj[u] do
7: if v.labels.contains(l) then
8 : D FS(G ,u)
9: Path.pop()
1 0 : re tu rn  result
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to eliminate the subpaths
Input: Graph dataset G, eliminate frequent subpaths 






















res ^  null 
for i ^  0 to N  do 
S ^  result.get(i) 
k ^  result.get(i).size() 
if k = maxSize then 
res.add(S) 
for all s in res do 
c o u n t^  0  
N  ^  s.size() 
for i ^  0 to N -  k + 1 do
if s(i) == result.get(i) then 
for j  ^  0  to k do




if count! = k then
res.add (result.get (i))
re tu rn  res
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This algorithm solely operates on the sorted result set obtained from Algorithm 1. 
Lines 5-7 gets the longest path and stores in k and saves the paths with size k into the final 
result without any processing. Lines 8-19 uses a variant of sliding window technique to 
obtain the non-redundant paths and save it to the result. The sliding window algorithm 
is an optimization algorithm to eliminate unnecessary iterations over a collection and is 
dependent on the size k . This implies that, fewer iterations are needed when k is large and 
higher number of iterations are needed when k is small. Line 20 returns the non-redundant 
paths from the list of paths obtained from Algorithm 1. The runtime complexity of this 
algorithm is O(nm + k ), where n represents the size of the result set, m represents the size 
of subpath, and k represents the size of the sliding window.
Theorem 2: Consider any directed acyclic graph G = (V, E, L), and let lm the 
label in L based on which the graph traversal is done. The algorithm produces a nonempty 
subpath set Sp, with edges containing values associated with lm from result set Ri.
Proof: Let Sp be a maximum-size subset of paths associated with label lm in Ri. 
Let (ni, ...nj, ...nk) where i < j  < k be the set of nodes connected by edges Ep associated 
with label lm in Sp . If the edges connecting ni ^  n- and n- ^  nk are equal then we are
done, eij = ejk, since ejk is a subset of edge set Ep associated with label lm. If eij ± ejk, 
let the edge set E'p = Ep -  (e-k} u (eyy}. By substituting eij for eyk we get E'p = Ep , which 
shows that eyy and e-k belongs to the same set i.e. having same label. This is true because 
ni is a child of ny and nk is a child ok ny. Since E'p = Ep , we conclude that E'p contains 
edges with label lm, and it includes e-k.
6.3. VALUATION FUNCTION
By definition, a valuation function characterized by various parameters returns the 
value of a state variable depending on the context of the system. In this case, the valuation 




Security domains act as a determining factor in the classification of information flow 
paths in the system based on the trust/integrity level achieved by evaluating the information 
flow paths. A security domain is considered as a logical partition of the system in which 
all the paths have an identical valuation function. The security domains are constructed as 
follows:
• Every component in the system is considered to be in its own security domain.
• The process of traversing the graph from one node to another node with respect to a 
feature combines all the nodes with different security domains into one single domain.
• This process is repeated for all the features which results in multiple security domains 
(total number of information flow paths).
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• If the valuation function exists and the values across all the edges are consistent for 
a certain label, all the security domains are combined into a single domain called 
Secure. If no valuation function exists, the security domains are combined into a 
single domain called Non-Secure.
To illustrate the above steps, consider a graph G as shown in Figure 6.1. It has seven 
nodes A - G, which are considered to be in their own security domain. After performing 
information flow traversal on the graph g with respect to the feature L results in 3 information 
flow paths, as illustrated in the Figure 6.2. These three information flow paths are considered 
to be in their own security domains resulting in 3 security domains. The consistency check 
of the values associated with label L results in two different values x and y. The conflicting 
values associated with feature L indicates the observer that one of the nodes is faulty or 
under attack.
©-̂ -©-"KD
Figure 6.2. Information Flow Paths
The illustrated information flow paths in Figure 6.2 show that node C is sending 
incorrect data and is said to be faulty. Based on this, the security domains can be further 
combined into Secure and Non-Secure domains. This partitioning of the domains helps the 
observer to identify the problem and make decisions based on the context.
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Figure 6.3. Security Domains
Theorem 3: MSDND analysis eventually results in two security domains SDsecure 
and SD fifon—Secure of the directed acyclic graph provided as its input.
Proof: Suppose that MSDND is run on a given DAG, G = (V, E, L). to determine the 
security partitions with respect to label l e L .l t  suffices to show that for any pair of distinct 
vertices (u,v)eV.  if security partition SD secure contains an edge from u -> v with edge label 
/ represented by (u -> v).l. then (u -* v).l = I. This indicates that the edges connecting the 
nodes in a particular security domain have consistent label values which ultimately helps 
in classifying the security partitions. Consider any edge (u, vj explored by MSDND. When 
this edge is explored, v cannot be added to the security domain unless the edge connecting 
u to v does not contain label /. Theorem 2 proved that the result set R, contains non-empty 
subpath sets Spr composed of edges with values associated with a specific label. Therefore, 
the distinct pair of vertices of a path in SD secure partition contains an edge from u -> v, 
such that (u -> v).l = I
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7. MSDND ANALYSIS
CPS design is a complex process as one needs to be concerned about physical, 
cyber, and cyber-physical threats. To alleviate the effects of such attacks, a CPS should 
be designed to ensure adequate and effective preventative measures are in place at the 
physical and cyber levels. The physical level measures include physical access restriction to 
assets, utilizing fault tolerance systems, employee monitoring, and keeping backup copies 
in remote locations. The cyber level measures include imposing robust cryptography 
techniques, using certified software, and user/service authentication measures.
The fundamental problems that need to be addressed while building any CPS include:
• Design the most reliable system that meets designated specifications.
• Ensure the system’s operation in the best conceivable way to meet specified require­
ments.
The optimal standard for achieving the problems mentioned above is to define them 
in terms of the performance measures and financial considerations. The major hurdle is to 
predict the performance measures of the system before it is developed or operated. This 
is not straightforward because most designers lack good intuition for complex systems. 
Additionally, proper computational mechanisms are hard and complex to develop. The data 
needed is difficult to obtain due to various factors, such as the sensitivity of the data.
CPS security research is structured around the modeling of systems for computing 
performance measures. The research in this field is based on stochastic processes, ap­
proximation methods, non-linear analysis and optimization, statistics, and other modeling 
techniques. In addition to these measures, there might be cases comprised of unforeseen 
scenarios such as unexpected failures, problems caused by unreliable machines, causal 
failures due to old equipment and environmental factors. These factors need to be con­
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sidered while coming up with an effective way of handling such scenarios. This section 
presents the MSDND analysis to address the issues with traditional approaches mentioned 
earlier. The MSDND analysis helps in identifying the failures and attacks in a CPS during 
design-time and run-time with the help of graph based analysis by analysing the values 
associated with the edge labels. MSDND analysis is an effective mechanism that can be 
implemented at design time and can serve as a potent tool for detecting and mitigating cyber 
and physical threats. This is achieved by depicting the CPS in terms of a graph network and 
partitioning them into different security domains based on edge labels. This analysis helps 
in identifying causal failures such as (i) failures caused by equipment operation outside the 
actual parameters, (ii) highly reliable equipment failure affecting other equipment, and (iii) 
failures caused by interacting components operating according to specification.
This section presents real-world case studies demonstrating how MSDND can help 
identify the cyber-physical vulnerabilities and failures in the avionic systems. Each case 
study represents either an attack on the system or a failure in the system. The attacks 
and failures are represented by incorrect values associated with the edge labels. These 
incorrect values are injected manually to represent an attack or failure. MSDND is applied 
to these scenarios to identify the vulnerabilities and provide mitigation techniques based 
on the valuation functions. All the scenarios are divided into two parts: 1) Identifying 
the compromised system. 2) Applying the graph-based model to identify the information 
flow paths and use the MSDND model to identify the faulty paths associated with the 
avionics system. Several aspects of the avionic systems have been evaluated to detect an 
attack or failure using the proposed methodology, capturing the information flow paths and 
partitioning them into security domains. Furthermore, the effectiveness of using security 
domains has been demonstrated to help with design time and real-time attack detection.
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7.1. ALTIMETER FAILURE
Theorem: In the case of altimeter compromise, the MSDND model yields de­
ducibility using automated graph-based analysis, thereby allowing critical information flow 
to the pilot and the controller.
Proof: Consider a scenario in which the barometric altimeter is faulty and is 
sending incorrect altitude data to the pilot (See Figure 7.1). In this case, the altimeter 
displays incorrect altitude values and thus making them NonDeducible to the pilot.
Figure 7.1. ATC Helps to Identify the Faulty Altimeter
The MSDND analysis is performed on graph G with respect to the feature “Altitude”, 
which results in a subgraph, as shown in Figure 7.2. Step 1 results in 129 information flow 
paths, and the resulting information flow paths set are further reduced by applying step 2. 
This results in 49 information flow paths by eliminating the subpaths (See Table 7.1). After 
eliminating the subpaths, step 3 is applied to evaluate the values associated with each label 
to check for consistency. If there is any inconsistency, the in-degree for each node of the 
information flow paths is calculated. If a node has an in-degree > 2 indicates that there is
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Table 7.1. Scenario 1 - Information Flow Paths
Feature # Paths # Indepen­
dent Paths
MSDND Secure Nodes
Altitude 129 49 Not ND Secure 6
more than one independent information flow path carrying similar information. If one such 
node exists, it is considered to have a valuation function, which eventually helps break the 
NonDeducibility property. If the valuation function exists for a node, the incoming edges 
are evaluated by backtracking to identify the faulty source. In this scenario, a valuation 
function exists for node 6, which helps break the NonDeducibility property. Figure 7.3 
represents the Secure and Non-Secure partitions with respect to the feature “Altitude”.
Figure 7.2. Graph - Altitude
The MSDND analysis is applied to verify the correctness of the graph-based MS- 
DND analysis. For this, consider three information flow paths (GPS domain, Altimeter 
domain, and ATC domain) to verify the correctness. Other information flow paths can also 
be used to determine if the MSDND property holds.
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This scenario considers two security domains, SDA {Altimeter Domain} and SDGPS 
{GPS Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDA and SDGPS with respect to 
the altitude value from the pilot domain,
SA = A - 1 (^ 4  A - 1 (^5 A -1(̂ 28 A _'SC7 A _'SC19 A - 'SC20 => (7.1)
Since the information received from the barometric altimeter domain is faulty, the 
pilot cannot valuate the correctness of the altitude data in that domain.
S ops  =  <P3 A <̂4 A <̂5 A <̂28 A <fi7 A <Al9 A <̂20 => (7 .2)
Even though the information received from the GPS domain is not faulty, the 
correctness of the altitude data cannot be valuated in that domain as the pilot cannot 
validate the correctness of the data with just two information flow paths.
From Equation 7.1 and Equation 7.2, the pilot can see two different information 
flow paths which result in different altitude values.
Figure 7.3. Graph - Security Domains
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By combining Equation 7.1 and Equation 7.2,
M SD N D (E S ) = 3w e W: [w h □ f  (SA, SGPS)]
A [w N ($Vpa A $Vp]
(7.3)
Therefore, the pilot cannot deduce that the barometric altimeter is faulty and is 
sending incorrect altitude data. This situation can be resolved by having an additional 
information flow path which helps the pilot to resolve the conflict.
S a TC = <£41 A (£42 A <£4 3  A <£3 7  A <£6  A <£2 8  A <£7  A £ 8  A £ 1 8  ^  3Vp  (7 .4)
In this scenario, the additional information flow path is retrieved from the GPS, 
which is responsible for sending altitude data, as shown in Figure 7.1.
By combining Equation 7.1, Equation 7.2 and Equation 7.11,
M SDND (ES) = 3w e W: [w h □ f  (SA, S R a , S g p s )]
(7.5)
a  [w N ( t V ^  a 3V P  a 3V P  ]
Hence, the system is not MSDND secure to the pilot as he/she can deduce the correct 
altitude value and thereby resolving the conflict by relying on alternate information flow 
paths.
7.2. SATELLITE FAILURE
Theorem: In the case of satellite (GNSS) failure, using automated graph-based 
analysis, the MSDND model yields NonDeducibility, thereby stopping critical information 
flow to the pilots.
Proof: Consider a scenario in which the GNSS is faulty and is sending incorrect 
position data to the aircraft. GNSS is responsible for sending the position data to the planes, 
and the planes communicate with each other. In the case of GNSS failure, the position
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information retrieved by the aircraft is incorrect, and the pilots communicate with each 
other based on this information. This failure could lead to potential mid-air collisions and 
incorrect decisions by the pilots if they could not identify the source that is sending incorrect 
data (See Figure 7.4).
Once the flight position is retrieved, the pilots trust the information sent by satellite. 
If there is another nearby aircraft, the pilots communicate based on the data transmitted by 
the satellite. To illustrate this in a better way, let Pilot-1 represent the pilot from Plane-1 
and Pilot-2 from Plane-2. Pilot-1 and Pilot-2 cannot identify the problem until they are too 
close, eventually leading to a breakdown in the separation. With the automated MSDND 
analysis, pilots can check for the consistency of information flow paths and find the source 
of the erroneous data.
Figure 7.4. Satellite Failure
Figure 7.5 represents the subgraph generated with respect to the label “pos”. Once 
the graph is generated, the sliding window technique with the length equal to the second 
shortest path from the set is used to eliminate the subgraphs from the set of graphs. 
Applying Algorithm 2 eliminates the subgraphs to avoid redundancy. In this case, there
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Pos 4 3 ND Secure NA
are no subgraphs, and this step does not result in a reduced set. After eliminating the 
subgraphs, the value associated with each label is evaluated to check for consistency. If 
there is any inconsistency, the in-degree for each node in the inconsistent set is calculated. 
If a node has an in-degree > 2 (indicates that more than one information flow paths are 
carrying similar information), it is considered to have a valuation function that helps break 
the NonDeducibility property. If the valuation function exists for a node, the incoming edges 
are evaluated to identify the faulty source. In this case, none of the nodes has an in-degree 
value greater than two (See Table 7.2). Therefore, the pilots from both the aircraft cannot 
deduce that satellite failure is causing the transmission of incorrect information. Figure 7.6 
represents the Secure and Non-Secure partitions with respect to the feature “pos”.
Figure 7.5. Graph - Satellite Failure
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Once the flight position is retrieved, Pilot-1 trusts the information sent by Plane-2 
and vice-versa. Pilot-1 and Pilot-2 cannot identify the problem until they are too close, 
which leads to a breakdown in the separation.
By applying MSDND analysis, the correctness of the graph-based MSDND analysis 
can be verified. In this case, two information flow paths from Pilot-1 Domain, and Pilot-2 
domain are considered to verify the correctness.
The two security domains in this scenario are SDP1 {Pilot-1 Domain} and SDP2 
{Pilot-2 Domain}. By combining the valuation functions in SDpl and SDP2.
Spl = -'Sc«0 A _,Sc«l A A _,SC«3 A _,SC«4 ~$V~pos (7-6)
Since the information received from the Pilot-2 domain is faulty, Pilot-1 cannot 
evaluate the correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sp2 = -,SC£0 A ~'ipb\ A A A =>• ~$V~pOS 0-7)
Figure 7.6. Graph - Security Domains
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Since the information received from the Pilot-1 domain is faulty, Pilot-2 cannot 
valuate the correctness of the position data in that domain.
By combining Equation 7.9 and Equation 7.10,
Therefore, the pilots from both the aircraft cannot deduce that satellite failure is 
causing the transmission of incorrect information.
Hence, the system is MSDND secure to the pilots as they cannot deduce the actual 
true position of the planes.
7.3. PITO T STATIC SYSTEM (PSS) FAILURE
Theorem: In the case of the PSS’s primary static source failure, using automated 
graph-based analysis, the MSDND model yields deducibility, thereby allowing critical 
information flow to the pilots.
Proof: Consider a scenario in which the primary static source is blocked as shown 
in Figure 7.7, and an alternate static source is used to provide static pressure. When this is 
used as a primary source for pressure, the altimeter projects a higher altitude reading, ASI 
displays higher airspeed than the actual airspeed, and VSI reports a momentary climb. In 
such cases, pilots are advised to rely on the flight manual or pilot’s operating handbook to 
calculate the error.
With the automated MSDND analysis, pilots can check for the consistency of 
information flow paths and find the source of the erroneous data without relying on manuals 
or handbooks. As MSDND captures all the information flow paths and performs checks
M SD N D (E S ) = 3w e W: [w h □ f  (Sp1,Sp2)]
A [w N ($V?Pos A ^P 1~ pos 'pos
(7.8)
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for consistency, pilots can be notified when there is a discrepancy. If the valuation function 
exists for airspeed and altitude, pilots can rely on other sources rather than computing the 
error manually.
Figure 7.7. Pitot Static System Failure
Figure 7.8 represents the subgraph generated with respect to the labels altitude 
and airspeed. Applying step 1 and step 2 of MSDND analysis results in 138 and 54 
information flow paths, respectively (See Table 7.3). Step 3 results in an in-degree greater 
than two for nodes ADS-B Transponder and Air Data Computer. These nodes help break 
the NonDeducibility property and ensure that the pilot need not rely on inconsistent data. 
Figure 7.9 represents the Secure and Non-Secure partitions with respect to the feature 
altitude and airspeed.
The MSDND analysis is applied to verify the correctness of the graph-based MS­
DND analysis. In this case, three information flow paths from the PSS, radio altimeter 
(RA), and GPS domain are considered to verify the correctness.
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Altitude 129 49 Not ND Secure 6, 7, 18, 28, 
37, 48
Airspeed 9 5 ND Secure 18
Figure 7.8. Graph - Altitude & Airspeed
The two security domains in this scenario are SDpss {pitot static system Domain} 
and SDRA {radio altimeter}. By combining the valuation functions in SDpss and SDRA,
S p s S  =  -'<^26 A -'<^28 A ~l<Pl A —"A8 A “ "Al4 => t V ~ a ( ^ .9 )
Since the information received from the Pilot-2 domain is faulty, Pilot-1 cannot 
evaluate the correctness of the position data in that domain.
Sra = A <A48 A <̂7 A SG9 A <̂ 22 =4- (7.10)
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Therefore, pilots cannot deduce that the pitot-static system is faulty and is sending 
incorrect altitude data. This situation can be resolved by having an additional information 
flow path that helps the pilots resolve the conflict.
S o p s  = <̂ 3 A i f 4 A i f 5 A i f 28 A <£7 A < £19  A </?20 => 3 V„  ( 7 . 1 1 )
In this scenario, the additional information flow path is retrieved from the ATC 
controller, which is responsible for sending altitude data, as shown in Figure 7.7.
By combining Equation 7.1, Equation 7.2 and Equation 7.11,
M SD ND (ES) = 3w tW :[w  \- a f ( S A, SGPS, SArc)]
A [w 1= {tVta  A 3VPa A 3 ^ ]
(7.12)
Hence, the system is not MSDND secure to the pilots as they can deduce the correct 
altitude value and thereby resolving the conflict by relying on alternate information flow 
paths. Therefore, the pilots can deduce that the pitot-static system is faulty.
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7.4. PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY FAILURE
Theorem: In the case of primary flight display’s (PFD) failure, the MSDND model 
yields deducibility, thereby allowing critical information flow to the pilots.
Figure 7.10. Primary Flight Display Failure
Proof: Consider a scenario in which the PFD functions incorrectly as shown in 
Figure 7.10. PFD serves as the primary reference for flight information for pilots. This 
system gathers information from various sources and displays it in order to reduce the pilot’s 
workload and increase situational awareness. As data from various sources is displayed on 
PFD, any failure in the PFD could lead to projecting incorrect data or no data at all.
With the automated MSDND analysis, pilots can check for the consistency of 
information flow paths and find the source of the erroneous data in addition to the Multi- 
Function Display (MFD) present in the cockpit. As MSDND captures all the information 
flow paths and performs checks for consistency, pilots can be notified when there is a 
discrepancy. If a valuation function exists for any of the data, pilots can rely on other 
sources rather than computing the error manually.
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Altitude 129 49 Not ND Secure 6, 7, 18, 28, 
37,48
Air Density 8 4 Not ND Secure 18
Airspeed 9 5 Not ND Secure 18
Heading 19 8 Not ND Secure 18, 31
OAT 5 3 ND Secure NA
TAT 5 3 ND Secure NA
Turn 12 3 ND Secure NA
Vertical Speed 13 6 Not ND Secure 28
Figure 7.11 represents the subgraph generated with respect to the labels Air Speed, 
Turn, Heading, Altitude, Vertical Speed, Attitude, AirSpeed, Air Density, Outside Air Tem­
perature and Total Air Temperature.
Figure 7.11. Graph - Air Speed, Turn, Heading, Altitude, Vertical Speed, Attitude, Air 
Speed, Air Density, Outside Air Temperature & Total Air Temperature
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Applying step 1 and step 2 of MSDND analysis results in 186 and 81 information 
flow paths, respectively (See Table 7.4). Step 3 results in an in-degree greater than two 
for the nodes ADS-B Transponder and Air Data Computer. These nodes help break the 
NonDeducibility property and thus ensuring that the pilot need not rely on inconsistent data.
Figure 7.12. Graph - Security Domains
Finally, step 5 is applied to partition the subgraphs based on the consistency of the 
information flow paths into Secure and Non-Secure domains. Figure 7.12 represents the 
Secure and Non-Secure partitions with respect to attitude and heading.
Hence, the system is not MSDND secure to the pilots as they can deduce the faulty 
source and thereby relying on alternate information flow paths to operate the aircraft.
7.5. MAGNETOMETER FAILURE
Theorem: In the case of magnetometer failure, the MSDND model yields de­
ducibility, thereby allowing critical information flow to the pilots.
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Attitude 14 6 Not ND Secure 6, 18
Heading 19 8 Not ND Secure 6, 18
Proof: Consider a scenario in which the magnetometer is faulty. In aeronautics, 
the magnetometer can be used to measure the geomagnetic field vector information of the 
position of the aircraft body, such as airplanes and satellites. According to the reference 
model for the earth’s magnetic field and local magnetic field, the angle information of a 
certain precision can be obtained through an algorithm. Therefore, the magnetometer is 
widely used in aircraft attitude determination systems, especially in microsatellites, such 
as nanosatellites and picosatellites, etc. Since this is one of the crucial instruments to 
determine the attitude, ensuring the normal function of this is of great importance.
Table 7.5, illustrates the total number of information flow paths and valuation 
functions associated with each label.
Figure 7.13. Graph - Attitude & Heading
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With the automated MSDND analysis, pilots can check for the consistency of 
information flow paths and find the source of the erroneous data in case of an attack or 
a failure. As MSDND captures all the information flow paths and performs checks for 
consistency, pilots can be notified when there is a discrepancy. If a valuation function exists 
for any of the data, pilots can rely on other sources rather than computing the error manually.
Figure 7.13 represents the subgraph generated with respect to the labels Attitude and 
Heading. Applying step 1 and step 2 of MSDND analysis results in 33 and 14 information 
flow paths, respectively. Step 3 results in an in-degree greater than two for nodes Flight 
Management System (FMS) and Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS) (See 
Table 7.5). These nodes help break the NonDeducibility property and thus ensuring that 
the pilot need not rely on inconsistent data.
Finally, step 5 is applied to partition the subgraphs based on the consistency of the 
information flow paths into Secure and Non -  Secure domains. Figure 7.14 represents the 
Secure and Non -  Secure partitions with respect to attitude and heading.
Figure 7.14. Graph - Security Domains
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Latitude 64 25 Not ND Secure 6, 18
Longitude 64 25 Not ND Secure 6, 18
7.6. RF INTERFERENCE
Theorem: In the case of RF interference, the MSDND model yields deducibility, 
thereby allowing critical information flow to the pilots.
Proof: Radio Frequency (RF) Interference is the term used to describe a range of 
situations in which transmissions such as unwanted other than those from authorized users 
of an RTF frequency interfere with radio reception.
Table 7.6, illustrates the total number of information flow paths and valuation 
functions associated with each label.
Figure 7.15. ATC Disconnect
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Radio interference usually comes from commercial stations on the ground. Some 
of the key contributing factors for RF interference are weather, atmospheric conditions, 
malicious and unauthorized transmissions. Interference can make communication difficult 
or even impossible, resulting in loss of communication. This interference eventually results 
in an increase in pilot workload and ATC workload and causes callsign confusion. Some 
of the known problems associated with RF interference are ATC disconnect, autopilot 
disconnect during the cruise, blank displays, uncommanded rolls or turns, FMS or autopilot 
standby, inoperative altimeter.
Let us assume that the ATC connection is lost with the pilots due to RF interference 
(See Figure 7.15). The MSDND analysis is applied to check whether the cause of the 
problem can be identified. With the MSDND analysis, pilots can check for the consistency 
of information flow paths and find the source of the erroneous data or stop relying on 
inoperative instruments in case of an attack or a failure. As MSDND captures all the 
information flow paths and performs checks for consistency, pilots can be notified when
Figure 7.16. Graph - Latitude & Longitude
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there is a discrepancy or blank displays. If a valuation function exists for any of the data 
such as latitude, longitude, or altimeter, pilots can rely on other sources rather than relying 
on handbooks or operation manuals.
Figure 7.16 represents the subgraph generated with respect to the labels latitude and 
longitude. Applying step 1 and step 2 of MSDND analysis results in 64 and 25 information 
flow paths, respectively (See Table 7.6). Step 3 results in an in-degree greater than two for 
nodes flight management system and ADS-B transponder. These nodes help in breaking 
the NonDeducibility property and thus ensuring that the pilot need not rely on inconsistent 
data.
Finally, step 5 is applied to partition the subgraphs based on the consistency of the 
information flow paths into Secure and Non-Secure domains. Figure 7.17 represents the 
Secure and Non-Secure partitions with respect to latitude and longitude.
Figure 7.17. Graph - Secure and Non-Secure
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7.7. UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED INDICATIONS
Theorem: In the case of unreliable airspeed indications, the MSDND model yields 
NonDeducibility, thereby stopping critical information flow to the pilots.
Proof: A failure to promptly recognize and respond to erroneous flight instrument 
indications can result in loss of control. To handle such situations, pilots should be aware of 
the PSS’s functioning and an understanding of the types of erroneous indications that can 
occur. The PSS will help the pilots realize that there is a problem and follow procedures to 
establish and maintain the aircraft in a safe condition by referencing the aircraft attitude, the 
thrust setting, and altitude as verified from at least two similar displays from independent 
data sources. There is an enormous manual work involved in this process, and this might 
lead to heavily relying on manuals to come up with an alternative solution.
Figure 7.18. Graph - Vertical Rate, Airspeed, Vertical Speed and Air Density
This situation is quite challenging as the pilots may only become aware of the 
problem when the aircraft has adopted an unusual pitch attitude. This situation gets further 
complicated, especially when the aircraft has entered a stall. The stall is a condition in 
which an aircraft cannot produce the required lift for regular operation as it exceeded its
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Vertical Rate 13 4 ND Secure NA
Airspeed 9 5 Not ND Secure 18
Vertical Speed 13 6 Not ND Secure 28
Air Density 8 4 not ND Secure 18
given critical angle of attack. In simple terms, a stall is defined as the aerodynamic loss of 
lift that occurs when an airplane’s wing exceeds its critical angle of attack. Furthermore, in 
the event of unreliable speed, autopilot, auto thrust, and flight directors can all contribute 
to loss of control.
With the MSDND analysis, pilots can check for the consistency of information flow 
paths and find the source of the erroneous data or stop relying on inoperative instruments 
in case of an attack or a failure. As MSDND captures all the information flow paths and 
performs checks for consistency, pilots can be notified when there is a discrepancy or blank 
displays. If a valuation function exists for any of the data such as altimeter, autopilot mode, 
turn, and heading, the pilot can rely on other sources rather than relying on handbooks or 
operation manuals.
Figure 7.18 represents the subgraph generated with respect to the labels vertical 
rate, airspeed, vertical speed and air density. Applying step 1 and step 2 of MSDND 
analysis results in 43 and 19 information flow paths, respectively. Step 3 results in an 
in-degree greater than two for nodes flight management system and ADC. These nodes help 
in breaking the NonDeducibility property and thus ensuring that the pilots need not rely on 
inconsistent data.
Table 7.7, illustrates the total number of information flow paths and valuation 
functions associated with each label.
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Finally, step 5 is applied to partition the subgraphs based on the consistency of the 
information flow paths into Secure and Non -  Secure domains. Figure 7.19 represents the 
Secure and Non -  Secure partitions with respect to attitude and heading.
Figure 7.19. Graph - Secure and Non-Secure
7.8. SUMMARY
This section presents a summary of the MSDND analysis performed on all the 
scenarios. MSDND analysis is performed on each feature to identify the independent 
information flow paths and the nodes that have a valuation function. This is essential to 
identify the faulty components in the system or attacks. This analysis can be used to identify 
design failures as well as can aid the pilots in identifying anomalous patterns in case of 
an attack or failure in real-time. During design-time, this analysis can be used to identify 
the vulnerabilities and propose possible mitigation measures. Table 7.8, illustrates the total 
number of information flow paths and valuation functions associated with each label.
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Figure 7.20 shows the information flow paths and NonDeducibility. The MSDND 
analysis is performed on the data collected by referring to the flight manuals, pilot hand­
books, and from ADS-B exchange platform. Based on this analysis, it is evident that per­
forming consistency checks on the values associated with the edge labels of the information 
flow paths gives an adequate understanding of the system's vulnerabilities. Additionally, 
Figure 7.20 shows that the valuation function evaluating to true is higher for a feature with a 
higher number of independent information flow paths that represent information flow from 
different components in a CPS. In some cases, the valuation function is evaluated to false 
even in the presence of a higher number of independent information flow paths. This result 
indicates that there is not enough redundancy for that particular feature, and appropriate 
measures can be taken during design-time to improve reliability in case of a failure and 
thereby enhance safety. Hence, MSDND can be used as an effective design-time analysis 
tool to identify vulnerabilities in the system and propose possible mitigation measures.
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Table 7.8. Information Flow Paths of the Components in Avionic Systems
F eatu re # P a th s # In d e p e n d en t
P ath s
M S D N D  S ecu re N od es
Altitude 129 49 Not ND Secure 6, 7, 18, 28, 37, 
48
Aircraft Course 2 2 ND Secure NA
Aircraft ID 13 4 ND Secure NA
Air Density 8 4 Not ND Secure 18
Airspeed 9 5 Not ND Secure 18
Angular Rate 2 1 ND Secure NA
Distance 13 5 ND Secure NA
Dynamic Pressure 1 1 ND Secure NA
ETBW 3 3 ND Secure NA
FFTR 3 3 ND Secure NA
Fuel Consumed 3 3 ND Secure NA
Fuel Level 1 1 ND Secure NA
Ground Speed 28 8 Not ND Secure 6
Heading 19 8 Not ND Secure 18, 31
IAS 4 2 ND Secure NA
Latitude & Longitude 64 25 Not ND Secure 6, 18, 37
Mach Number 4 2 ND Secure NA
OAT 5 3 ND Secure NA
Pos 4 3 Not ND Secure 3
RA 2 2 ND Secure NA
Static Pressure 2 2 ND Secure NA
TA 2 2 ND Secure NA
TAT 5 3 ND Secure NA
Time 3 3 Not ND Secure 3, 6
Track Angle 11 3 ND Secure NA
True Airspeed 4 2 ND Secure NA
Turn 12 3 ND Secure NA
Velocity 4 2 ND Secure NA
Vertical Rate 13 4 ND Secure NA
Vertical Speed 13 6 Not ND Secure 28
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Figure 7.20. Information Flow Paths vs NonDeducibility (The x-axis represents compo­
nents in an aircraft. The y-axis represents information flow paths, the solid line indicates 
independent information flow paths, and the triangle represents whether the component is 
MSDND secure in case o f an attack or failure.)
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8 . MPENN - MESSAGE PASSING EDGE CONVOLUTIONS NEURAL
NETW ORK
8.1. GRAPH NEURAL NETW ORKS (GNN)
Graph analysis using convolutional neural networks (CNNs) has become widely 
popular due to the ability to capture rich relational information among entities using struc­
tural graphs. CNNs are prevalent in fields such as computer vision, speech recognition, or 
natural language processing (Simonovsky and Komodakis, 2017; Wu etal., 2020). Anomaly 
detection is another important problem that has been well-studied within distinct research 
areas and application ranges. The anomalies or outliers represent a deviation in the data. 
According to (Hawkins, 1980), an outlier or anomaly is defined as an observation that 
"deviates so significantly from other observations as to arouse suspicion that it was gener­
ated by a different mechanism." In all these fields, the underlying data representation is in 
the form of a layer structure. In contrast, many other structures such as physical systems, 
social networks, computational chemistry, and 3D-modeling have the data represented in 
non-euclidean domains, which is easier to express in terms of graphs.
Nevertheless, this transition from grids to graphs of CNNs is complex and has 
recently gained interest among researchers. Researchers have introduced GNNs that are 
analogous to hierarchical CNN-like architecture to handle graph structures. Modeling 
complex systems such as CPSs requires a model to learn from graph data. Graph structured 
data provides scope for prediction tasks on a variety of real-world problems. This work is an 
attempt to apply graph neural networks to critical infrastructures, to partition the security 
space of a specific CPS into different domains. A graph classification algorithm using 
GNNs is introduced in this section to achieve partitioning functionality. Performing such
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an analysis using GNN is still in its initial stages due to the unavailability of large datasets 
of CPS’s attack data. Since there is limited data available for a CPS, datasets from the 
chemical domain are used for analysis.
The datasets used in this section has the following structure:
• Each chemical compound has a set of subgraphs with edge and node features. This is 
similar to the subpaths associated with the particular feature discussed in Section 7. 
For example, the information flow paths associated with the feature altitude while 
traversing the graph.
• Each subgraph is associated with a label representing a certain property of the chem­
ical compound. This is akin to the domain label associated with information flow 
paths i.e. Secure and Non-Secure.
Note: In the remainder of this section, the terms "class label" and "classes" are used 
to represent the Secure and Non-Secure security domain partitions.
A few anomalies have been injected into the data that represent anomalies in a 
CPS to perform the classification of the subgraphs into Secure and Non-Secure classes 
based on domain partitioning. For example, consider the case of a compromised altimeter 
which presents incorrect altitude readings. The anomalies, in this case, are represented by 
incorrect altitude interpretations that differ from the ones retrieved from other components 
in an aircraft, such as the GPS. Based on the actual and anomalous data, the proposed GNN 
model classifies them into one of the two associated labels (in case of CPS, it is Secure and 
Non-Secure) in the dataset. To represent these sort of instances, the edge features of a few 
instances in the chemical compound datasets has been tweaked so that one class represents 
data that belongs to Secure domain whereas the other class represents anomalous data that 
belongs to Non-Secure domain.
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The anomalies in chemical compounds originate from thermodynamic and structural 
alterations (de Oliveira et al., 2006; Greer and Moldover, 1981). Structural anomalies 
include distortions, phase changes, electronic configurations. Thermodynamic anomalies 
include the effect of pressure and temperature. The analogous structural and thermodynamic 
anomalies in a CPS include compromised control systems (malware and sending false 
control signals), manipulated communication traffic, compromised sensors, and actuators 
due to an attack or failure, incorrect information transmission due to wear and tear of 
physical components. In the aircraft example, in case of an attack or failure, anomalies can 
be in the form of incorrect sensor readings or display values. This similarity between the 
anomalies in CPS and chemical compounds provided a strong basis to utilize the datasets 
from the chemical domain to perform the security domain classification. In this work, the 
primary goal is to demonstrate the GNN models’ effectiveness in automating the process of 
partitioning the CPS’s security domains. This supervised learning can be used in real-time 
with respect to a CPS to identify the vulnerabilities and partition them into security domains.
In this dissertation, a Message Passing Neural Network (MPNN) (Gilmer et al., 
2017), a general framework for supervised learning on graphs, has been used along with 
edge convolutions (Simonovsky and Komodakis, 2017). Though there is increased research 
related to the MPNN framework, there is a need for new variations that can fit well for 
applications such as partitioning the security domain in a CPS. In this work, a neural 
network architecture that accepts graphs of arbitrary structure has been introduced. Given a 
dataset containing graphs in the form of (G ,y) where G represents a graph and y represents 
its class, the model reads the graphs directly and learns a classification function. Two main 
challenges associated with this approach are: 1 ) extracting useful features for classification 
purpose characterizing the rich information encoded in a graph and 2 ) reading the graphs 
sequentially in a significant and logical order. Addressing these challenges is essential, 
particularly while handling complex structures like CPSs. In a CPS, the relationships 
between nodes in a graph represent various components, and the edges represent complex
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interactions with underlying semantics. A localized graph convolution model has been 
implemented to address the first challenge, along with its association to graph kernels. 
The SortPooling layer (Zhang et al., 2018) has been used to address the second challenge, 
which sorts graph vertices in a logical order so that regular neural networks can be trained 
on the graphs. The SortPooling layer is essential to sort the vertex features in a coherent 
order. The sorted data can later be used by traditional convolutional and dense layers 
to perform additional analysis. In the case of graphs, vertices can be sorted based on 
their structural roles within the graph in contrast to image and text classification, which has 
natural ordering. The graph labeling introduced in (Zhang et al. ,2018), has been used to sort 
vertices in a preprocessing step, which is based on the Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL) algorithm 
(Shervashidze et al., 2011). Experiments on benchmark graph datasets demonstrate that 
the proposed architecture achieves excellent performance by classifying the graphs based 
on domain partitioning.
The contributions are as follows: Section 8.1.1 introduces the Graph Nets library 
that defines the graph structure. Section 8.1.2 discusses the importance of graphs in 
physical systems. Section 8.1.3 discusses the MPNN model in terms of graph networks. 
Section 8.1.4 introduces the neural network model based on edge convolutions to partition 
the graphs into one of the two available classes.
8.1.1. G raph Nets L ibrary. The Graph Nets library (Battaglia et al., 2018) has 
been used to define the graph structure. This network takes a graph as input and returns 
a graph as output. The input graph is composed of edge-level (E), node-level (V), and 
global-level (u) attributes. The output graph contains updated attributes with the same 
structure as the input graph. Graph networks are part of the broader family of "graph neural 
networks" (Scarselli et al., 2008). In this model, a graph is defined as G = (u, V, E) in 
which u represents a global attribute, V = {vi}i=\:Nv represents the set of nodes, where vi 
represents a node’s attribute, N v is the cardinality and E = {(ek,rk,s k)}k=v.Ne represents 
the set of edges, where ek represents the edge’s attribute, N e is the cardinality of edges, rk
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is the receiver node’s index, and sk is the sender node’s index. The functions defined in 8.1 
are used to perform update and aggregation operation on the nodes, edges and the graph. 
These can be formulated as follows:
e k = <Pe (ek ,v rk , V sk ,u) e'i = p ê v (E ' ) 
v'i = (e'i,Vi,u) e = p ê u (E )
u = (f>u(e ,V ,u) Vi = p v̂ u(V ) (8.1)
where Ei = {(ek,rk, sk)}rk=i,k=hNe, V' = {vi}i=i:Nv, and E ' = u,-E'. The (f>e is used to com­
pute individual edge updates, the <pv is applied across all nodes to compute individual node 
updates, and the <pu is the global update which is applied once. The p  functions each take 
a set as input, and results in a single element which represents the aggregated information. 
The important property of the p  functions is that it is invariant to permutations of the in­
puts, and takes multiple numbers of arguments such as mean, maximum, and element-wise 
summation.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to update the node, edge and global attributes (Battaglia et al.,
2018)_________________________________________________________________________
Input: Graph dataset G, with edges E, vertices V and global attribute u 
Output: Updated Tensors for edges, nodes and global attributes l 
1 : function G r a p h N e t w o r k (E, V, u)
2 : e'k — et
3: for i — l to N n do
4: let E ' = {(ek,r t,S k )}
5: e-' -  )
6 : vi — <pv (ei,Vi,u)
7: let V' = {v }i=l:Nv
8 : let E ' = {(e'k,rt,sk)}k=i:Ne
9: e — (pe^ u (E ')
1 0 : v ' — (pv^ u (V')
1 1 : u — (pu(e ,v ,u)
1 2 : re tu rn  (E ' ,V ',u  )
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The neural network model takes graph G as an input and the computations progress 
from the edge, to the node, and finally to the global level. Figure 8.1 shows the message 
passing architecture used in this work with its update and aggregation functions. Algorithm 3 
which is a modified version of the algorithm proposed in (Battaglia et al., 2018) shows the 
following steps of computation:
• In this algorithm, (pe is not applied to the edges, and ek is assigned to e'k for to match 
the convention of the equations in 8.1. This results in a set of per-edge outputs for 
each node, i, given by E ' = {(e'k,r k,s k)}rk=,k=1 :#e whereas E ' = u iE'i contains the 
set of all per-edge outputs. For example, in an aircraft example this corresponds to 
the altitude value that is being passed from one node to another.
• In the next step, p e^ v is applied to E ', that aggregates the edge updates for all the 
edges that project to node i, and results in ei. This edge update ei will be used in the 
next step’s node update. In this way all the edge updates that project onto altimeter 
are used to update the altimeter node based on the consistency of the edge attribute 
ek.
• 0v is applied to each node i, which computes updated node attribute, v'i . This results 
in a set of per-node outputs, V' = {v)}i=i:̂ v . In this step, each node’s attribute values 
are updated to either of the three values 1 , - 1 , and 0 , where 1  represents edge attribute 
values are consistent, - 1  represents edge attribute values are inconsistent, whereas 0  
represents that the edge attribute does not exist.
• In the next step, p e^ u is used to aggregate all edge updates. This function is applied 
to E ', and the result e will be used to compute the global update.
• p v̂ u is used to aggregate all node updates. This function is applied to V', and the 
result v' will be used to compute the global update.
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• In the last step, <pu is applied once per graph to compute global attribute update, u . 
In the aircraft example, all the values associated with edge labels are aggregated to 
result in E' and the node updates result in V' which are then used in the global update 
process, w\ to update the class of the graph (Secure or Non -  Secure).
E d g e  U p d a t e  N o d e  U p d a t e  G l o b a l  U p d a t e
Figure 8.1. Message Passing Architecture
8.1.2, Importance of Graphs. Graphs can predominantly express arbitrary rela­
tionships among entities, which implicitly enables the model’s input to determine how 
entities interact and stay isolated. For example, an edge between two nodes represents a 
relationship, whereas the absence of an edge represents that there is no relationship and 
cannot influence each other. The entities and relationships in a graph are represented by sets, 
which are invariant to permutations. The graph networks being invariant to the order of the 
input elements is often a desirable property. In addition, the node and edge update functions 
are reused across all nodes and edges, respectively. This means every edge and node in the 
graph has knowledge about other edges and nodes respectively which helps in computing
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the global feature. This is an essential element which served as a motivation to partition 
the security domains in a CPS by having the knowledge about every other component and 
interactions between the components.
8.1.3. Message Passing Neural Network (MPNN). This section explains the 
MPNN algorithm in terms of graph networks. In this section, the input is assumed to ex­
plicitly specify the relational structure. Examples of data with such an assumption include 
physical systems, knowledge graphs, optimization problems, social networks, chemical 
graphs, parse trees, and road networks with known interactions.
An adjacency matrixA and a set of feature vectors for the nodes are given as inputs 
to the MPNN model. The adjacency matrix A is comprised of vector-valued entries to 
indicate the information flow between different nodes in the graph. The edge and node 
outputs typically are in the form of lists of vectors or tensors, one per edge or node, and 
the global outputs are in the form of a single vector or tensor. This provides a flexible way 
for a graph network's output to be passed to other deep learning networks such as CNNs. 
MPNN proposed in (Gilmer et al., 2017) has similar structure to graph nets architecture 
discussed in 8.1.1. The only difference is that the readout function used in (Gilmer et al., 
2017) doesn’t take E ' as an input.
8.1.4. Message Passing Edge Convolutional Neural Network (MPENN). This 
section describes the various components of the proposed MPENN algorith to classify the 
graphs into different classes (different domains in case of CPS) based on edge, node and 
global updates. MPENN is comprised of three sequential stages as shown in Figure 8.2:
• The vertices’ local substructure features are extracted by the graph convolution layers 
based on the edge features.
• Node features are computed and updated based on the consistency of the edge features, 
which are then used to update the global feature.
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• The final output predictions are made by the traditional convolutional and dense layers 
by processing the updated graph representations.
8.1.4.1. Message functions. The following sections illustrate the functions used in 
the MPENN model to compute node and edge features.
• Matrix Multiplication: The message function is defined as M (hv, hw,e vw) = Aevw hw 
where hv and hw represent node features, evw represent edge features and A represents 
adjacency matrix.
• Edge Network: The authors in (Gilmer et al., 2017) proposed a message function to 
support vector-valued edge features. This function is represented by M (hv, hw, evw) = 
A (evw)hw where A (evw) is a neural network which maps the edge vector evw to a 
d-dimensional square matrix.
• Pair Message: In general, using matrix multiplication rule, the message from node 
w to node v is not dependent on the hidden state hv and is a function only of the 
edge evw and the hidden state hw. The messages should depend on both the source 
and destination nodes to make an efficient utilization of the network channels in a 
network. To achieve this, the message function described in (Battaglia et al., 2016) 
has been used. Therefore, the modified message function is mwv = f  (hw,hv,evw) 
which represents the message from w to v accompanying edge e, where f is a neural 
network.
8.1.4.2. G raph convolutional layers. The graph convolutional layers (Zhang et al., 
2018) takes a graph G and its node information is encoded in the matrix X e Rnxc as inputs, 
where n is the input and c is the number of features. The graph convolution layer takes the 
following form:
Z,+1 = f  (D-1G Z W ) (8.2)
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where /  is a non-linear activation function, G = G + I represents the adjacency matrix of 
the graph, D represents the diagonal matrix, and Z e R,;xc represents the output activation 
matrix. The following four steps discusses the graph convolution operation:
& : \ \r, n / \ \ \
i ” /*











X3 Edge Convolutions on a single node
Node updates
Figure 8.2. MPENN Architecture
• A linear function to transform the features is applied to the node information matrix, 
denoted by XW. This transformation maps the input feature channels c to c channels 
in the following layer. The filter weights used in the transformation W, are shared 
among all vertices.
• In the next step, the node information is propagated to neighboring vertices as well 
as the node itself using AY  where Y = XW.
• In the next step, each row i is multiplied by D j^ . This is done to maintain a uniform 
feature scale after graph convolution.
• In the final step, a pointwise non-linear activation function /  is applied which outputs 
the results of the graph convolutions.
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The graph convolution extracts local substructure information by aggregating node 
information in local neighborhoods. This enables the node information to be shared across 
all the participating nodes and identify any discrepancy in the data.
8.2. EXPERIM ENTAL RESULTS
Three benchmark datasets have been used to evaluate the performance of the 
MPENN model. All the three datasets have two class labels each representing certain be­
haviour. To achieve the intended partitioning functionality based on edge and node features, 
a few instances of the data belonging to a particular class label have been modified to repre­
sent anomalies. The code and data are available at https://github.com/anusha_at/MPENN.
MUTAG accuracy scores based on batch sizes
Figure 8.3. MUTAG - Accuracy
8.2.1. Datasets. The benchmark datasets from various fields to compare and ana­
lyze the graph classification accuracy of MPENN using graph kernels are NCI1, NCI109, 
and MUTAG. NCI1 and NCI109 datasets are composed of chemical compounds that are 
screened to identify non-small cell lung cancer and ovarian cancer cell lines, respectively 
(Wale et al., 2008). MUTAG (Debnath et al., 1991) is a data set with a collection of 188
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mutagenic aromatic and heteroaromatic nitro compounds labelled according to whether they 
have a mutagenic effect on a specific bacterium called Gramnegtive bacterium Salmonella 
typhimurium. All these datasets are vertex and edge labeled and has two class labels.
NCI1 accuracy scores based on batch sizes
Figure 8.4. NCI1 - Accuracy
8.2.2. Configuration. As described in Section 8.1.4, MPENN-network has four 
layers. Its configuration is described as Conv-32^Conv-32^Conv-32^M P^GAP^FC- 
32^D-0.1^FC-1, where Conv -  o denotes a convolutional layer using batch normalization 
with o output channels, D -  p  is a dropout with probability p, ReLU  is the activation 
function with dropout probability of 0.2, MP  denotes max-pooling, GAP denotes global 
average pooling, and FC -  o denotes fully connected layer with o output channels. Labels 
are encoded as one-hot vectors. The MPENN model is trained with stochastic gradient 
descent (SGD) and cross-entropy loss for 300 epochs with batch sizes 1, 50 and 100 and a 
variable learning rate starting from 0.001 and optimized after 50, 100, and 150 epochs.
8.2.3. M etrics. This section presents the metrics that are used to measure and 
compare the performance of the MPENN model.
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• Confusion Matrix: The Confusion matrix is one of the most intuitive and widely used 
metrics in deep learning for finding the model’s correctness and accuracy. It is used 
for classification problems in which the output belongs to one of the two or more 
associated classes.
-  True Positives (TP): True positives indicate instances in which the actual class 
of the data instance and the predicted class is True.
-  True Negatives (TN): True negatives indicate instances in which the actual class 
of the data instance and the predicted class is False.
-  False Positives (FP): False positives indicate instances in which the actual class 
of the data instance is False, and the predicted class is True.
-  False Negatives (FN): False refusals indicate instances in which the actual class 
of the data instance is Dependable, and the predicted class is False.
NCI 109 accuracy scores based on batch sizes
Figure 8.5. NCI109 - Accuracy
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• Accuracy: Accuracy is used to measure the total number of correct predictions made 
out of all the predictions made by the model. Accuracy is given by,
TP + TN
A ccu ra cy  = t p + f p + t n + f N  (83)
• Loss: The loss function is an important parameter to calculate the error of the model 
during the optimization process. Cross-entropy is the most commonly used loss 
function in deep learning. Cross-entropy is from the information theory field, based 
on entropy, and usually calculates the difference between two probability distributions. 
The cross-entropy loss is given by,
1  N
L(y i j i ) = - n  E yi-l°s{p {y i)) + ( 1  -  yt) .l°g (1 -  p (yt)) (8 .4)
where yt represents the actual label, y t represents the predicted label, p(y)  is the 
probability of the label being the actual label, N  is the size of the input,
MUTAG loss based on batch sizes
Figure 8 .6 . MUTAG - Loss
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NCI1 loss scores based on batch sizes
Figure 8.7. NCI1 - Loss
Table 8.1. Results on MUTAG, NCI and NCI109. These datasets were evaluated for 
accuracy and cross-entropy loss using MPENN.
Dataset Batch Size Epoch Accuracy Loss
NCI1 1 2 0 0 0 . 8 6 0.29
NCI109 1 2 0 0 0.91 0 . 2 1
MUTAG 1 300 0 . 8 0.24
NCI1 50 2 0 0 0.75 0.49
NCI109 50 2 0 0 0.5 0.74
MUTAG 50 300 0.9 0.31
NCI1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0.75 0.49
NCI109 1 0 0 2 0 0 0.5 0.74
MUTAG 1 0 0 300 0 . 8 8 0.35
8.2.4. Results. Table 8.1 exhibits that MPENN model performs with an accuracy 
score of 87.33% for edge-labeled and node-labeled datasets to classify the graphs based 
on edge and node features. Figures 8.3 - 8 . 8  demonstrates the performance of the model 
over 300 epochs in terms of accuracy and loss. Each dataset performs well at different
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NCI109 loss scores based on batch sizes
Figure 8 .8 . NCI109 - Loss
hyperparameter settings, and this can be chosen based on the performance of the model and 
the dataset. The results demonstrate the importance of exploiting edge labels to identify the 
anomalies and classify the graphs using convolution-based methods. The model works by 
exploiting the edge feature to update the node features and then finally updating the global 
feature to either one of the two class labels associated with the respective dataset. Each 
dataset is characterized by different attributes, such as protein and chemical compounds. The 
model achieved good performance by classifying the graphs based on the anomalies injected 
into the data. For example, the MUTAG dataset is composed of different components, each 
consisting of multiple subgraphs. These subgraphs are fed into the model to perform edge 
and node updates. As discussed in Section 8.1.1, these node updates are used to update 
the global state to either of the two class labels associated with the dataset (aromatic or 
non-aromatic). In this case, the non-aromatic instances of the dataset are composed of 
inconsistent edge labels representing a discrepancy representing anomalies in a CPS. The 
MPENN model performs updates on these subgraphs to classify them based on the node
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and global updates. These results show that MPENN can effectively classify the graphs 
and can be used as a general mechanism to classify the graphs based on anomalies present 
in the edge features. Two other datasets NCI1 and NCI106 have been used to make sure 
that this model generalizes well to other datasets as well. Based on these results, this 
model can be used to identify and classify the security domains in a CPS system with 
proper hyperparameter settings, identify the security vulnerabilities in a CPS and perform 




This section discusses the broader understandings and assumptions of this disserta­
tion, in addition to the technical specifications in sections 6  to 8 . This section is divided 
into three sections: Section 9.1 presents the scope of applicability of the proposed approach 
to CPS. Section 9.2 summarizes the limitations of the approach, including the concerns of 
its practicality. Finally, Section 9.3 presents the directions of future work enabled by this 
dissertation.
9.1. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED APPROACHES
Despite the extensive research in CPS security, there is a need to identify and 
mitigate the attacks in CPS. In this dissertation, an automated MSDND model is designed 
and implemented. MSDND is applied to various attack scenarios targeting a specific 
component failure in an aircraft. MSDND works by identifying independent information 
flow paths and partitioning them into different security domains based on the consistency 
of the information flow. The model proposed in this paper is suitable for attacks and failures 
in a CPS with complex state transitions.
From a conceptual point of view, the graph-based model performs the following 
functions:
• Detect -  Determine the presence of an anomaly or potential failures in the information 
flow paths.
• Evaluate -  Assess the impact of the anomaly based on the valuation functions.
• Prioritize -  Determine if removing the affected information flow path affects the 
system.
80
• Verify -  Check if mitigation is possible by examining the nodes that have valuation 
functions.
• Action -  Partition the information flow paths into Secure and Non-Secure domains.
9.2. LIMITATIONS
Implementing a generalized security mechanism for a wide variety of CPS is a 
difficult task. Our approach aims at solving this problem by implementing a graph-based 
model and the features associated with the edges and vertices are hand-crafted. More 
research can be done in this area to come up with automatic feature recognition and link 
predictions.
9.3. FUTURE WORK
In moving forward, the focus would be on the following:
• Extend the MSDND analysis to other infrastructures and monitor if all the attack 
scenarios are identified.
• Use MSDND to model confidentiality, integrity and availability vulnerabilities.
• Make MSDND analysis scalable to extend this to all the critical infrastructures to 
identify and evaluate cyber-physical risks.
• Apply graph neural networks to automatically construct the graph and identify the 
anomalies. This is done by clustering the components in the system based on the 
validation of the information flow paths (the information flow paths qualified as 
secure will be in secure security domain and the other information flow paths will be 
in non-secure security domain).
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• Use graph neural networks to construct the graphs from architecture diagrams of a 
CPS and perform link prediction to connect different components.
• Use a feature extraction model to label the nodes and vertices in a graph based on 
neighbor interactions and their features.
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